Nigeria’s worsening security landscape has forced a difficult but necessary conversation back into the national spotlight: should policing remain centralised, or is it time to devolve power to the states?
The proposal by the Inspector-General of Police, Olatunji Disu, to decentralise policing through the creation of state police commands is one of the most ambitious security reform efforts in recent years. But as with many structural reforms in Nigeria, the question is not just whether change is needed—it is whether the proposed change can deliver without creating new risks.
At the heart of the proposal is a detailed framework that moves beyond rhetoric into design. It outlines a 60-month phased transition, beginning with constitutional amendments and culminating in a fully operational two-tier policing system. Under this arrangement, a Federal Police Service would retain responsibility for national security concerns such as terrorism and interstate crime, while state police commands would handle localised offences, including armed robbery, homicide, and community-level intelligence gathering.
A significant shift in personnel structure is also envisioned. The framework projects that about 60 per cent of existing police personnel would transition to state services, with the remaining 40 per cent retained at the federal level. Framed as a voluntary process, the transition would include incentives such as training programmes, salary support, and pension continuity—an attempt to preserve institutional memory while avoiding disruption.
Perhaps the most striking element of the proposal is its funding model. It recommends the creation of a constitutionally backed State Police Fund, financed through three per cent of the Federation Account allocation and a mandatory minimum of 15 per cent contribution from state security budgets. By ring-fencing these funds, the proposal aims to address long-standing concerns about underfunding and opacity in policing, while insulating operations from political interference.
Proponents argue that decentralised policing would significantly improve responsiveness and intelligence gathering. With officers embedded within communities and supported by structured engagement platforms involving traditional rulers, youth groups, and civil society actors, the model seeks to rebuild public trust—an element the framework describes as operationally essential, not merely desirable. The emphasis on community policing, including the use of liaison officers fluent in local languages and evaluated through citizen feedback, reflects an attempt to align policing with the social realities it is meant to serve.
Yet, for all its ambition, the proposal must contend with deeply rooted concerns. Chief among them is the fear that state police could become instruments of political control in the hands of governors. Nigeria’s political history offers ample reason for such caution. Although the framework introduces safeguards—including independent State Police Service Commissions, criminal penalties for unlawful directives, and expedited judicial review of abuses—the effectiveness of these measures will depend heavily on the integrity of institutions tasked with enforcing them.
There are also practical questions around capacity and equity. While some states may possess the financial and administrative strength to sustain effective police forces, others may struggle to meet the proposed funding obligations. This raises the risk of uneven security standards across the federation, potentially deepening existing inequalities rather than resolving them.
The phased implementation plan, while methodical on paper, introduces another layer of uncertainty. Constitutional amendments, political consensus, and intergovernmental coordination are notoriously difficult to achieve in Nigeria. A reform of this magnitude will test not only policy design but also political will.
In many ways, the proposal reflects a careful attempt to balance reform with restraint—pairing decentralisation with oversight, and autonomy with standardisation through mechanisms such as a proposed National Police Standards Board. It is a recognition that Nigeria’s security challenges are both national and local, requiring solutions that operate effectively at both levels.
Still, the success of the initiative may ultimately rest on a familiar but decisive factor: implementation. Nigeria is not short of well-crafted policies; it has often struggled with consistent execution. The safeguards outlined in the framework are robust on paper, but their resilience will be tested in practice, where political pressure, institutional weakness, and resource constraints frequently collide.
State policing, as envisioned in this proposal, carries the potential to transform Nigeria’s security architecture. But it also carries risks that cannot be ignored. Whether it becomes a long-overdue reform or a new layer of complexity will depend not just on the strength of its design, but on the discipline, transparency, and accountability that accompany its execution.
