The Nigeria Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (NCDC) has said states such as Lagos, FCT, Rivers, Kano, Enugu, Borno, Aka Ibom, Cross River, Taraba, and Adamawa with known trade/travel routes, international airports/seaports, porous borders and ground crossing were at high risk of Ebola.
This was contained in an advisory addressed to Commissioners for Health of the 36 States of the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory on Thursday.
Titled, “National Public Health Advisory on State Preparedness for Bundibugyo Ebola Virus Disease(EVD)”, NCDC said the immediate objective of national preparedness and readiness efforts was to ensure that every State and the FCT could reasonably detect, contain, and respond swiftly to any suspected case while protecting health workers and sustaining essential health services.
They noted that although Nigeria has no confirmed case of ebola outbreak at the time of the advisory. However, based on the Dynamic Risk Assessment conducted by NCDC and partners immediately after the PHEIC declaration, the overall risk of importation of the disease into Nigeria has been assessed as HIGH due to increasing on-going regional transmission, international travel, regional population movement, major airports, seaports, porous land borders, informal crossings, trade routes, and the overlap of early Ebola symptoms with common febrile illnesses such as malaria, Lassa fever, and other endemic infections.
Speaking on the current situation the agency said, “A total of 1,077 suspected cases and 247 deaths have been reported in the DRC and Uganda. Case fatality is as high as 24.6%, and the age group mostly affected is 14-45 years. Regional and national risk remain high.
“Currently, there are no approved vaccines or specific treatments available for Bundibugyo Ebola virus disease. Control of the outbreak depends largely on rapid public health measures, including early detection, prompt isolation of suspected and confirmed cases, strict infection prevention and control (IPC) measures, contact tracing, safe burial practices, community engagement, and strong surveillance systems.
“Suspected cases have been reported in India, while Canada has announced a “temporary pause” on travel applications by residents of DRC, Uganda, and South Sudan due to the outbreak. Very recently, Uganda also announced border closure measures”.
On the implications for Nigeria, NCDC stated that the current Bundibugyo virus outbreak has no licensed vaccines or approved targeted therapeutics.
The Agency has therefore activated its national Emergency Operations Centre, and was currently in the alert mode, coordinating national preparedness with relevant federal and state institutions.
Commissioners for Health were therefore requested to ensure immediate operational readiness across public and private health systems with preparedness focused on early detection, immediate isolation, strict infection prevention and control, safe sample handling, contact tracing readiness and safe referral systems, adequate provisions for medical countermeasures amongst others.
According to the NCDC, “while all States and the FCT must maintain Ebola preparedness, the pace of readiness should reflect each State’s importation and transmission risk. NCDC has therefore grouped States into three preparedness tiers:
“High Risk: Known Trade/travel routes with international airports/seaports, porous borders and ground crossing (Lagos, FCT, Rivers, Kano, Enugu, Borno, Aka Ibom, Cross River, Taraba, and Adamawa.
“Moderate Risk: Ogun, Nasarawa, Kaduna, Plateau, Kogi, Niger, Jigawa, Katsina, Bauchi, Ebonyi, Abia, and Bayelsa.
“Baseline Preparedness: All remaining States”.
The Agency therefore requested States Governments to provide leadership for coordinated Ebola readiness across their respective States and the FCT, with technical support from NCDC.
The Commissioners were requested to “activate the State public health coordination structure for Ebola preparedness, conduct arapid state risk assessment, with attention to points of entry (where applicable), population movement, high-density settings, and facilities most likely to receive suspected cases.
“Engage public and private health providers to ensure early suspicion, safe separation of suspected cases, and immediate notification through approved public health channels”. Identify at least one functional holding or isolation facility for suspected cases and ensure a clear referral pathway for safe transfer and further management amongst other measures.
