The Court of Appeal in Abuja will on Friday hear SERAP’s bid to overturn a ₦100 million defamation judgment, with the group arguing that two State Security Service officers never proved that its publications were about them.
SERAP is asking the court to set aside the 5 May 2026 judgment of Justice Yusuf Halilu of the Federal Capital Territory High Court. The judgment found the group liable, awarded damages to the two officers and ordered it to publish an apology.
In its Appellant’s Brief of Argument, dated 3 September 2026 and filed by its counsel, Tayo Oyetibo, SAN, SERAP relies on 24 grounds of appeal. They cover the elements of defamation, the burden of proving identification, the quality of the evidence before the trial court, and the protection of free expression and public interest advocacy.
SERAP says the central question is whether the officers showed by credible evidence that the publications referred to them. It argues that the publications named no one and offered only general physical descriptions.
The case arose from SERAP’s account of 9 September 2024, which alleged that DSS officers unlawfully entered its Abuja office. The account followed the group’s call on President Bola Tinubu to investigate alleged corruption at the Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited and to reverse fuel price increases. The publications described the officers as a tall, large, dark-skinned woman and a slim, dark-skinned man.
In the brief, SERAP says: “Where a claimant is not expressly named in a publication, the burden remains on the claimant to establish by evidence the circumstances from which a reasonable reader would understand the publication to refer specifically to that claimant. That essential link was not established in this case.”
The group adds that neither publication identified the officers by name, rank, designation, office or photograph, and that the descriptions were not unique to them. It also notes that no member of the public or independent witness testified that they understood the publications to refer to the officers, and that the social media reactions the officers relied on were never tendered in evidence.
SERAP further faults the trial judge for relying on his own observation of the officers’ appearance in court. “The issue was whether the publications identified the respondents when they were published, not whether the respondents happened to fit the descriptions when they appeared before the Court,” the brief states.
SERAP also raises problems with how the suit was brought. It says the officers first sued SERAP, which it describes as not a juristic person, and later amended the writ to name the Incorporated Trustees of SERAP. “An amendment cannot cure a void originating process,” the brief says.
The group further argues that the first respondent signed her witness statement at her lawyers’ chambers instead of before a Commissioner for Oaths. It says adopting the statement in open court could not cure that defect.
On damages, SERAP argues that the trial court relied on claims that the publication affected the officers mentally and psychologically and had gone viral, without proof of how widely it spread or of any specific professional, financial or reputational harm. It says the alleged suspension of the officers was not backed by independent documentary evidence, making the award excessive and arbitrary.
SERAP says its publications were fair comment on a matter of public interest and that the trial court did not properly consider its defences, including qualified privilege. According to the brief, there was no proof of malice, and disagreeing with SERAP’s account does not establish defamation.
The group also points to Section 39(1) of the Constitution, which protects freedom of expression.
“Officers of a public security agency do not, by virtue of their office, become immune from legitimate criticism concerning the manner in which public functions are performed,” the brief says.
SERAP adds that the publications, as shown in Exhibit D2, targeted the SSS as an institution, yet the two officers sued in their personal capacities. It calls the suit frivolous and vexatious.
“Civil society organisations must be able to scrutinise and comment on the conduct of public institutions without the threat of disproportionate legal consequences,” SERAP says.
It urges the Court of Appeal to uphold due process and constitutional protection of free expression by setting aside the judgment and consequential orders.
